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The UK-Irish Criminal Justice Cooperation Network is a collaboration between Northumbria University, 
Queen’s University Belfast and the Association for Criminal Justice Research and Development in 
Ireland (ACJRD) and is funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. The aim of the network is 
to understand the challenges the UK and Ireland might face in relation to criminal justice cooperation 
after Brexit and to explore how these challenges might be mitigated. The network held a total of five 
events from 2018 to 2020. A conference planned for April 2020 has been postponed until 2021 due 
to the Covid-19 pandemic. Throughout the duration of the network over 70 stakeholders participated 
in events from a broad range of criminal justice institutions, including police, prosecutors and border 
control, across Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, along with policy makers 
and academics. A special edition of the Journal of Criminal Law, published in November 2020, includes 
four papers which emanate from the network. All of these papers have sought to understand the 
close relationship between British and Irish criminal justice agencies and explored ways of ensuring 
this relationship is protected and even enhanced in the coming years, regardless of the eventual 
relationship between the UK and the EU. 
This briefing paper is based on the following articles:
Gemma Davies, ‘Facilitating cross-border criminal justice cooperation between the UK and Ireland 
after Brexit: ‘Keeping the lights on’ to ensure the safety of the Common Travel Area’ (2020) The 
Journal of Criminal Law
Paul Arnell and Gemma Davies, ‘Extradition Between the UK and Ireland after Brexit: Understanding 
the past and present to prepare for the future’ (2020) The Journal of Criminal Law
For more information on the network please contact:
Gemma Davies, Associate Professor, Northumbria University: gemma.davies@northumbria.ac.uk 
Katy Hayward, Professor, Queen’s University Belfast: k.hayward@qub.ac.uk
Maura Butler, Chair, ACJRD: Maura.butler@acjrd.ie 
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INTRODUCTION
Whatever the final relationship between the UK and the EU post-Brexit the relationship will not be the 
same. At least some of the instruments that have been utilised to great effect over the last 20 years 
will not be available. The UK and Ireland will therefore have to find alternative ways of ensuring that 
cooperation between the two countries continues to flourish. A UK-EU comprehensive agreement 
is the optimal way of achieving this. In the event of the UK and the EU not reaching such a deal 
it is important to understand that the advent of GDPR and the Law Enforcement Directive mean 
that informal cooperation will be much less effective than it has been in the past. Formalising police 
cooperation through legal instrument and establishing a joint operational centre offers a positive way 
forward. This is more likely to be successful if supplemented by high level forums for cooperation. 
What the UK negotiates with the EU about criminal justice cooperation both now and in the future 
uniquely impacts Northern Ireland. It is recommended that the remit of the British-Irish Council be 
expanded to include criminal justice cooperation. This would emulate the Nordic model which sees 
criminal justice cooperation driven by justice ministers in the Nordic Council despite four different 
types of relationship between its constituent members and the EU. 
Secondly, in the event of a non-negotiated outcome between the UK and the EU the UK and Ireland 
should explore bilateral agreements. A bilateral agreement on extradition is particularly needed. The 
EAW depoliticised extradition North and South and whilst there is political will on both sides for this to 
continue, falling back on the 1957 Convention forces extradition back into the political space. There 
are few legal limitations on a bilateral extradition agreement which could, in some respects, even offer 
improvements to the EAW. Bilateral agreements cannot replace EU databases and EU data protection 
rules will apply to any agreement which includes the exchange of personal information. An EU data 
adequacy decision would make the conclusion of bilateral arrangements much easier. However, in the 
absence of such a decision the UK and Ireland will need to work together to ensure Irish LEAs can be 
satisfied that appropriate safeguards are in place.
4  |  UK-Irish Criminal Justice Cooperation Network Briefing, 19 November 2020
SUMMARY
Ireland and the United Kingdom have enjoyed free movement of people by virtue of the Common 
Travel Area (CTA) since Ireland declared independence in 1922. British and Irish citizens can move 
freely, without passport controls, and reside in either jurisdiction and enjoy associated rights and 
privileges, including the right to work, study and vote in certain elections and access to social 
welfare benefits and health services. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 8 May 2019 
which reaffirmed the commitment of both Governments to the CTA post-Brexit. Ireland and the UK 
joined the European Community in 1973 and most aspects of the CTA were gradually overtaken by 
developments in EU law. Inevitably the close but informal cooperation in criminal matters enjoyed by 
the UK and Ireland, framed by the CTA, became increasingly challenged as Irish criminal law diverged 
from British law through the 1960s and this worsened as a result of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. 
This process of divergence might have continued were it not for the role of the EU which became a 
driving force for convergence. 
Criminal justice has only been a devolved matter in Northern Ireland since 2010. This move was 
consistent with important changes made possible in Northern Ireland by the Good Friday (Belfast) 
Agreement (GFA) as it emerged from direct rule by the UK Government during the Troubles. The 
priority here has been to embed an inclusive and community-based form of policing by consent, in 
which all parts of the still fractured Northern Ireland society have a stake. A human rights focused 
approach to policing was a necessary part of the peace process as policing had been so bound up 
with community tensions following the independence of Ireland. The GFA and the devolution of 
responsibilities for policing and justice to the Northern Ireland Executive marked an era of enhanced 
capacity for coordination in this area. One of the priority areas for discussion in the North/South 
Ministerial Council (on the island of Ireland) has consistently been that of justice. The Council was 
established under the GFA to develop consultation, cooperation, and action within the island of 
Ireland. 
Cooperation between the UK and Ireland in policing and criminal matters has long predated membership 
of the EU and much cooperation between the two countries is outside of the EU framework. Today 
cross-border cooperation between Ireland and the UK is anchored by the Intergovernmental Agreement 
on Co-operation on Criminal Justice Matters (July 2005 and April 2010), which provides a structured 
framework to enhance and develop more effective North-South cooperation and coordination and 
includes a programme of secondment between the two police forces. In 2010 and again in 2016 the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and An Garda Síochána (ASG) launched a Joint Cross-border 
Policing Strategy, which aims to disrupt criminal activity across the border. In addition to these more 
formal structures, the Joint Manual of Guidance aims to support police and prosecution services 
across both jurisdictions dealing with investigations that have a cross border element. In November 
2015, the UK and ROI governments and the Northern Ireland Executive agreed to the creation of a 
Joint Agency Task Force as part of a concerted and enhanced effort to tackle organised and cross-
jurisdictional crime led by senior officers from the PSNI, AGS the Revenue Commissioners and HM 
Revenue and Customs. However, the absence of an Executive in Northern Ireland between 2017 and 
2020 has meant that the work of the task Force has been less visible that it could otherwise have 
been. Every year the PSNI and AGS hold a Cross Border Conference on Organised Crime aimed at 
enhancing cooperation.
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1. UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT
Despite the close working relationship between the PSNI and AGS, Brexit presents a risk of increased 
criminality between Northern Ireland (NI) and Ireland at a time when loss of EU police and judicial 
cooperation mechanisms could negatively impact operational effectiveness. Transnational crime – by 
its nature – crosses borders, and any changes to a border can impact the volume of crime or the way 
criminal gangs exploit borders. The extent to which the risks outlined below are realised depends on 
what the final relationship between the EU and the UK looks like. The more tangible the border and 
the greater the regulatory divergence, the greater the impact will be on crime; and the greater the 
loss of EU police and criminal justice cooperation, the greater the impact on cross-border policing.
2.1 Immigration crime
The UK and Ireland have never participated in Schengen and maintained separate immigration policies 
in relation to non-EU citizens. Prior to Brexit, free movement of people meant that they had the same 
approach to circa 445 million EU citizens. The UK will soon be free to alter its immigration policies in 
relation to EU citizens, and these policy changes will likely mean there is an increase in the number 
of people who are eligible to enter Ireland but not the UK. At the same time the UK Government has 
promised that ‘there will be no routine immigration controls on journeys within the Common Travel 
Area, and none on the land border between NI and Ireland’. Whilst UK and Irish authorities have always 
worked cooperatively, informal information exchange has been superseded by EU measures. Not 
only does a significant amount of information come through EU databases, but EU data protection 
law governs how all personal data is shared between member states. Brexit could negatively impact 
the quality of information police and border officers have access to, particularly in a no deal scenario.
2.2 Commodities smuggling
The extent to which Brexit might impact smuggling demand depends on how the Northern Ireland 
Protocol is implemented and whether there is a UK-EU free trade agreement (FTA). If there is this would 
minimise incentives for smuggling because there would be no scope to exploit tariff differentials. If 
there is no FTA, then there will be increased incentives for smuggling across the Irish Sea from Great 
Britain (GB) in order to access the EU single market and thus avoid paying tariffs levied on legitimate 
GB to EU trade. The risk will be greatest for those goods which could face the highest EU tariffs. 
However, the risk of smuggling across the Irish Sea is lower than that of smuggling across the Irish 
border given the added logistical difficulties and the costs of movement across a sea border impacts 
the profitability of such smuggling.
The risk of smuggling could also increase if the application of the UK Internal Market bill means that the 
UK diverges from EU standards and those goods can freely circulate in NI. A ‘race to the bottom’ would 
mean that there will be a need for tighter controls on goods entering NI from GB. Foods produced 
to lower standards are cheaper to produce and the incentives to smuggle such goods into NI and/
or onward into Ireland, would be greatest where the price differential is significant. The introduction 
of a new customs arrangements is an opportunity for new kinds of fraud, and this will need to be 
monitored closely. The EU will be keen to assess the scale and immediacy of the subsequent risk for 
smuggling which could exploit a poorly enforced sea border, particularly in a no deal scenario.
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2. WHAT EFFECTS BREXIT MAY HAVE ON 
CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL CRIMINALITY
2.3 Resurgence of domestic terrorism
The extent to which there is a risk of a resurgence in domestic terrorism in the coming years is unclear, 
but Brexit was presented in Northern Ireland along nationalist and unionist lines which has served to 
confirm old divisions. Dissident Republican terrorists have in the past used the border to frustrate 
counter-terrorism operations, while they and other organised crime gangs breached bail and crossed 
the land border to avoid prosecution. The political sensitivity of the border comes in to play when 
we look at how to mitigate crime risks across the border. There is evidence of strong opposition 
to any kind of physical manifestation of a border which could become a target, particularly for the 
Republican movement. The UK must resist a knee-jerk reaction which could undermine the fragile 
peace agreement in NI.
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Despite the positive number of bi-lateral police cooperation arrangements between the AGS and PSNI 
EU tools and databases still facilitate much of the cooperation between the two. Both forces have 
made clear that such arrangements enable them to provide a quicker, more efficient, and dynamic 
response to crime and criminality and allow significant coordinated operations particularly against 
organised criminal gangs. The ability to accurately and quickly access up-to-date information and 
criminal intelligence has been the hallmark of EU police and criminal justice measures since the Hague 
Programme which introduced the concept of availability as the guiding concept for law enforcement 
information exchange. The expansion of the EU, including the introduction of the Schengen borderless 
area and the well-established principle of free movement of persons has continually strengthened 
the need for criminal justice cooperation and the sharing of personal data between member states. 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 fundamentally transformed the EU’s power to adopt 
police and criminal justice measures. The loss of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and information 
databases are frequently cited as being of most concern to law enforcement. The most important 
databases for UK law enforcement are: the exchange of biometric data under the Prüm Instruments 
(Prüm); the exchange of criminal records information via the European Criminal Records Information 
System (ECRIS); the exchange of intelligence data under the Second Generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II) the Swedish Initiative and Naples II. Each of these databases serves a different purpose 
and therefore has a different legal basis. Whilst this has in the past been only of technical interest it 
comes to the fore in negotiating the UK’s post Brexit relationship with the EU. The UK and the EU 
have both stressed their desire to maintain a close relationship in this area after Brexit and both have 
published draft texts. However, with such a short time left until the end of the transition LEAs are 
earnestly preparing for a no deal scenario.
3.1 What would a deal look like for criminal justice information 
sharing?
According to the EU’s draft text published in March 2020 the only databases the UK would have full 
access to, even in a deal scenario, is Prüm and PNR. There is no precedent for a non-EU country 
accessing ECRIS (not even non-EU Schengen countries do), although the agreement proposed by 
the EU does offer some improvements to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters 1959 which could be broadly comparable to ECRIS, particularly if the EU would agree to the 
UK using the current technical platform. This would mean that whilst the underpinning legislation 
would alter the manner by which criminal records are exchanged would not. The extent to which the 
UK would have access to a comparable system in the event of a deal being made on security remains 
to be seen. 
There is also no legal basis in the EU treaties for a non-EU, non-Schengen country to participate in 
SIS II. Non-EU Schengen countries such Switzerland and Norway can access SIS II but pay into the 
EU budget, accept the supremacy of the ECJ and incorporate the relevant parts of the Schengen 
acquis into their domestic law. The EU draft proposal offers provisions for the exchange of criminal 
justice information which are akin to the Swedish Initiative in that states must ensure the conditions 
for accessing information and intelligence are not stricter than those applicable at domestic level. 
However even in a deal scenario information is provided in response to a request rather than through 
real time access to the databases. There will not be a replacement which mirrors the capabilities of 
SIS II or the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) via Europol. The UK will fall 
back on the Interpol I-24/7 database as a replacement for SIS II. 
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3. LOSS OF EU COOPERATION TOOLS  
AND DATABASES
3.2 What would no deal look like for information sharing?
If the transition period ends without a comprehensive agreement the UK will lose access to Prüm, 
PNR, improvement to the 1959 Convention on criminal record exchange and a replacement for the 
Swedish Initiative. The UK will also no longer be able to use any personal data it received in the past 
from the EU. The ability to obtain personal data from EU partners will be impacted. Transfers from a 
UK LEAs to EU LEAs will be covered by a UK transitional data adequacy decision and will be permissible 
if the transfer is necessary for law enforcement purposes. However, transfers to the UK will become 
immediately uncertain as the UK will become a ‘third country’ for EU data protection purposes. 
Without an EU adequacy decision UK LEAs will need to satisfy EU partners that there are adequate data 
protection safeguards. All EU member states must comply with the transfer provisions of the GDPR 
and any national data protection law. UK LEAs are being advised by the Information Commissioner’s 
Office that EU senders of data will probably require a contract or binding legal instrument or find 
some other way of assessing appropriate safeguards are in place. The UK is starting from a point of 
unprecedented alignment with EU data protection rules. However, the UK draft text seeks to agree 
bespoke data protection provisions with the EU which would mean cooperation would not depend on 
data adequacy. Whether the UK is willing to compromise on this position has yet to be seen. The ECJ, 
in the Schrems II decision, demonstrated the court is willing to robustly assess adequacy decisions 
and has the power to strike them down. The court appears to be requiring a standard of protection 
close to that of GDPR and has little interest in third country norms. The UK and EU will need to ensure 
transparency in any data adequacy decision to ensure its ongoing stability.
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After the creation of the Irish Free State and the establishment of the Common Travel Area extradition 
between the UK and Ireland was facilitated through a backing of warrants system. Whilst this worked 
well between Great Britain and Ireland this was not the case between the Republic and Northern 
Ireland. Having its origins in Irish case law, a functioning system of extradition broke down from 1928 
to 1965 during which time there were no practically applicable arrangements between the two. New 
legislative provisions in 1965 sought to formalise extradition but were still a hybrid which incorporated 
aspects of orthodox international extradition agreements and the previously applicable backing of 
warrants system. 
In 1973 both the UK and Ireland joined what was then the European Community. Whilst integration in 
the field of police and criminal justice matters was originally a challenge, it was eventually recognised 
that it must follow as a corollary of free movement. In this vein the Framework Decision on the European 
Arrest Warrant was adopted in 2002. Both Ireland and the UK have been part of the EAW since its 
inception and amended their law in accordance with it. The EAW facilitates a simplified procedure 
enabling surrender decisions to be made by judicial authorities on the basis of mutual recognition. The 
benefits of the system are heightened in the Ireland-UK historical and political context. They include 
the absence of a political offence exception and orthodox double criminality requirement. The EAW 
contains limited grounds for refusal, including no bar on the extradition of nationals. It has created 
an effective and efficient process which plays a crucial role in Ireland-UK criminal justice cooperation 
today.
4.1 What does a deal look like for extradition?
UK participation in the EAW is not possible after 31 December 2020. However, both the UK and EU have 
proposed a replacement which closely mirrors the agreement between the EU and Norway/Iceland, 
which in turn is similar to the EAW. A mutually agreeable deal on extradition is within touching distance, 
but a few key issues remain. A proportionality test for incoming requests and a test of trial readiness is 
requested by the UK. Both are tests that the UK has brought into domestic law to deal with concerns 
about the operation of the EAW. Secondly the EU states that the ECJ should have sole jurisdiction to 
interpret provisions or concepts of Union law. The UK wants no role for the ECJ and instead suggests 
political resolution of disputes via a joint committee. These issues are not insurmountable. However, 
time is now very short. Surrender is merely one part of a proposed comprehensive agreement 
between the EU and the UK. There are a considerable number of obstacles still standing in the way of 
conclusion of an agreement.
 4.2 What does a no deal look like for extradition?
In the event of an agreement between the EU and UK not being concluded and ratified by 31 December 
2020 the UK and Ireland will fall back on the European Convention on Extradition 1957 (ECE). This 
is clearly sub-optimal. The ECE operates through diplomatic channels and therefore extradition 
entails political approval in the extraditing country. Unlike the EAW, there are no strict time limits and 
states are not required to extradite their own nationals. Further, under the ECE there are no agreed 
exceptions to the dual criminality requirement and several safeguards for requested persons in part 1 
of the Extradition Act 2003 would no longer be available. An important point affecting the efficiency 
of a future extradition process is the loss of the Schengen Information System II. Whilst distinct from 
the EAW, it operates alongside it by providing real time warrants and alerts. Its loss means Interpol red 
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4. EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE UK  
AND IRELAND
notices using diplomatic channels will be relied upon. Most EU countries have ceased using Interpol 
inter se. Overall, the ECE is out-dated and little used amongst member states. This may lead to UK 
warrants not being dealt with as a priority and UK prosecution authorities having to rely on informal 
in-country relationships to a greater extent. Ireland has made legislative provision to fall back on the 
ECE for extradition with the UK and has not, as yet, started operating SIS II. UK and Irish prosecutors 
have close working relationships and have prioritised Brexit preparations. However, the ECE must 
follow diplomatic, not judicial channels and an increase in appeals and a slowing down of response 
times is inevitable.
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EU criminal justice cooperation facilitates much of the joint work between the PSNI and the AGS. Both 
forces have made clear that participation in EU measures have enabled them to provide a quicker, 
more efficient, and dynamic response to crime. A UK-EU comprehensive agreement covering criminal 
justice cooperation is the optimum outcome for all parties. However, the role of the ECJ in dispute 
resolution and UK commitment to and domestic implementation of the European Convention of 
Human Rights currently stand in the way of a deal. 
Workshops held by the UK-Irish Criminal Justice Cooperation Network have revealed the extent of 
Brexit preparation by all criminal justice organisations in the UK and Ireland. A recent example of their 
successful cooperative strategy can be seen in Operation Arbacia which worked to prevent planned 
attacks on police and prison officers in Northern Ireland in the run-up to the conclusion of the Brexit 
talks. Brexit has not only created risks but also opportunities. It has increased the conversations 
about the international world, highlighted differences in legislation and approaches in the regions. 
Overall, there is more communication now between different agencies and relations between AGS 
and PSNI are better than they have ever been. However, there are external constraints. High level 
political rhetoric does not always transform into real forums where agencies can work on the issues 
that Brexit presents. No one can remove the fact that the border is deeply politically sensitive, and 
this can thwart progress. 
5.1 Proposed Joint Operational Centre
Members of the UK-Irish Criminal Justice Cooperation Network felt that focus should not just be on 
maintaining cross-border relationships but on enhancing them and this could be achieved by the 
creation of a permanently established joint operational centre involving key personnel from across 
the island of Ireland as well as relevant UK organisations such as the NCA. This could operate on 
a model seen between multi-agency hubs for UK joint intelligence and operations but on a cross-
border level. The PSNI have suggested to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee that:
With the provision of a suitable data adequacy position and the opportunity to take forward bilateral 
arrangements between UK and Ireland we believe there are significant opportunities to develop new 
approaches such as the provision of a bespoke centre of excellence relating to crime cooperation 
and coordination. Appropriate integration of operational and investigative collaboration across a 
range of agencies and remits would enhance existing capacity and capability based on the traditional 
collaborative “taskforce” model.2
Such cooperation would work best if it had a legal basis. An example of highly functional police 
cooperation can be seen between the Nordic countries. Cooperation is based on formally signed 
international law instruments supplemented with intergovernmental protocols. Enhanced cooperation 
is premised on a shared history (not always harmonious), a common legal and policing culture and 
the removal of passport controls long before the advent of Schengen. Cooperation is driven by the 
Nordic Council which is the official body for inter-parliamentary cooperation. Adherence to the rule 
of law and human rights principles underpin cooperation. There are also models of cooperation 
2Written evidence submitted by the PSNI to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Cross-border co-operation on policing, 
security and criminal justice after Brexit published 7 October 2020
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5. MITIGATING THE RISKS OF BREXIT
between police in the South of England and France which, from a legal perspective, is ahead of what 
is available between the north and south of Ireland. The UK-France Coordination and Information 
Centre underpins cooperation between the UK and France. The centre’s legal basis comes from the 
Sandhurst Treaty. The UK should investigate with Ireland the appetite for agreeing a similar treaty and 
coordination centre with its own budget. Such a centre is more likely to succeed if under the remit of 
the British-Irish Council. 
5.2 Bilateral agreements in the event of a no deal
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is an area of shared competence in which either the EU 
or member states can adopt legal acts. However even if negotiations were to fail many aspects of 
criminal justice cooperation remain an area of competence of the EU. The Commission launched 
infringement proceedings against four states for signing an agreement with five Western Balkan 
countries on the automated exchange of DNA. This demonstrates that member states cannot enter 
into bilateral agreements which replicate EU databases. Other areas of bilateral exchange are possible 
but if they involve personal data exchange, they will fall under the purview of the ECJ and would be 
doomed to fail without close alignment of the UK to EU data protection. In the event of a no deal an 
adequacy decision is very important, and a legal framework which enables the spontaneous sharing 
of information is vital for public safety and must be a priority for the UK Government.
A possible solution to the loss of the EAW in the event of a no deal is a bilateral Ireland-UK extradition 
treaty. There is precedent for bilateral agreements on extradition which can closely mirror, or in fact 
surpass, the EAW in terms of efficiency. Five Nordic countries (not all of which are EU members) 
have a regional system of extradition termed the ‘Nordic Arrest Warrant’ (NAW). The NAW mirrors a 
number of aspects of the EAW and mutual recognition is made explicit. The notable differences are 
that there are even lower minimum penalties and double criminality is completely abolished under 
the NAW. Further, procedural time limits are shorter than those within the EAW. It is therefore possible 
for Ireland and the UK to conclude a bilateral extradition agreement with terms that provide for even 
closer cooperation than the EAW. The drivers for a regional Nordic system of extradition are equally 
present between the UK and Ireland. Nordic countries have a closely connected history, similarities 
in their legal systems and languages and removed their borders long before the advent of Schengen.
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